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Advancing the “Right” to Counsel  
in Removal Proceedings 
Matt Adams 
INTRODUCTION 
Persons inside the United States who are placed in removal proceedings 
(formerly known as deportation proceedings) potentially face both the threat 
of prolonged custody as well as forcible expulsion from the country, which 
often results in permanent separation from family and home. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which governs these proceedings, 
has a statute providing for the “Right to Counsel.” However, the statute 
makes clear that persons are only entitled to legal representation when they 
are fortuitous enough to retain counsel at “no expense to the government.”1 
Given this law, only those who can afford to retain a private attorney, or 
have the good fortune to obtain pro bono counsel, receive legal 
representation. The rest are forced to forge through the complex 
immigration system without an attorney. Consequently, the majority of 
persons charged as deportable (who are referred to as “respondents” in 
removal proceedings) are obligated to stand alone in immigration court. 
Even though the majority of respondents are unrepresented, removal 
proceedings are extremely adversarial: in each case, the respondent must 
face off against a U.S. trial attorney, who is advocating that the immigration 
judge order his or her removal from the United States.2 
Federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged the complexity of removal 
proceedings and the plight of individuals who are forced to defend 
themselves without legal representation.3 It is, by no means, an easy feat to 
successfully maneuver this morass even with experienced legal 
representation. Despite the enormous interests that are at stake in removal 
proceedings, and notwithstanding the indisputable adversarial nature of 
170 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
these complex proceedings, where the respondents are opposed by 
experienced U.S. trial attorneys trained on the intricacies of immigration 
law, the respondents are not entitled to assigned counsel. 
While the INA does not provide for appointed counsel at government 
expense, established case law from the Supreme Court—providing a 
constitutional basis for asserting the right to appointed counsel in other 
fields—lays out a roadmap for advocates to follow in challenges to removal 
proceedings. Up until the present date, case law has been relatively scarce 
with regard to the specific challenges of seeking assigned counsel in the 
context of immigration proceedings. What little case law there is at least 
acknowledges the opportunity to seek appointed counsel on a case-by-case 
basis. This must serve as a starting point. The current system, especially 
with regard to those who are detained during removal proceedings, is 
simply inadequate as it fails to provide the respondents with a 
fundamentally fair hearing. 
I. THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF REMOVAL     
PROCEEDINGS 
Loss of liberty through immigration custody must be a primary factor in 
any analysis regarding the right to appointed counsel in removal 
proceedings. Most respondents are detained during the removal 
proceedings.4 Some detained respondents are eligible to request a bond 
hearing before the immigration judge to determine if they can either obtain 
an initial bond or have their bond reduced so as to avoid incarceration 
during this lengthy process.5 Again, at each bond hearing, the detained 
respondents must face off against a U.S. trial attorney who is opposing their 
request. For some respondents, a successful bond hearing will allow them to 
avoid literally years of detention during protracted removal proceedings.6 
However, there is much more at risk than this immediate loss of liberty. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the broad range of fundamental 
liberty interests at stake in deportation proceedings. In discussing the 
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government’s efforts to denaturalize individuals and subject them to 
deportation, Justice Brandeis famously opined ninety years ago that such an 
action “may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes 
life worth living.”7 Those who are ordered deported will be banished from 
this country and, as a result, will lose their homes, property, employment, 
and often any possibility of continuing with their livelihood. 8 
In addition, many persons will be permanently separated from family, 
loved ones, and friends. Respondents include persons who have lawfully 
resided in this country for decades, including those married to U.S. citizens 
and those who have U.S. citizen children. The overwhelming majority of 
persons ordered removed will never qualify to be readmitted. Thus, unless 
their family members are able to leave their own jobs, education, and other 
family members in order relocate with them to the foreign country, they 
face permanent separation from their loved ones. 
Other respondents have just arrived to the United States after fleeing their 
countries of origin to escape various forms of persecution and now face the 
risk of being forcibly returned to the very governments that previously 
ordered their imprisonment and often torture. In light of these recurrent 
factors, the Supreme Court has long recognized that deportation results in a 
severe penalty that affects core rights:  
Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it 
visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the 
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That 
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be 
doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by 
which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards 
of fairness.9 
II. VAST NUMBERS OF PRO SE RESPONDENTS 
In light of the liberties at stake and the complexity of the immigration 
system, it is striking that most respondents must appear pro se as they are 
unable to retain a private attorney. The percentages of respondents who are 
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forced through the process without legal representation vary slightly 
throughout the country, but the numbers processed by the Seattle and 
Tacoma immigration courts make clear that the majority of respondents are 
obliged to defend themselves in immigration proceedings. For the last 
calendar year reported (2008), 10,211 cases were completed in Seattle and 
Tacoma; and, of those, almost 70 percent (7,220 individuals) were forced to 
appear unrepresented in removal proceedings.10 
Closer examination reveals the extent to which detention limits an 
individual’s opportunity to obtain legal representation. The majority of 
respondents in removal proceedings, more than 65 percent, were detained. 
Of those who were detained, more than 90 percent were unrepresented. On 
the other hand, those who were not placed in custody during their 
proceedings were able to obtain legal representation in almost 68 percent of 
the cases.11 
III.  CASE LAW ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FROM 
CRIMINAL TO CIVIL 
Over the last forty-five years, developments in case law have created a 
now familiar legal framework for determining whether an indigent person 
in custody or facing deprivation of liberty is entitled to assigned counsel. 
The landmark case, Gideon v. Wainwright,12 clearly established the general 
right to assigned counsel for all indigent persons in criminal proceedings 
facing deprivation of physical liberty. Soon thereafter, in a case examining 
whether a juvenile in delinquency proceedings was entitled to counsel, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to court appointed counsel may 
extend beyond criminal proceedings.13 That case, In Re Gault, established a 
per se rule that juveniles in delinquency proceedings who were at risk of 
confinement were entitled to court-appointed counsel under the due process 
clause, even though they were not in criminal proceedings and, thus, did not 
enjoy the same Sixth Amendment protections relied on by the Court in 
Gideon. 
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However, fifteen years later, the Supreme Court took a dramatically 
different approach in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County, a decision addressing whether an indigent parent facing termination 
of her parental rights was entitled to a court-appointed attorney.14 Instead of 
determining whether all similarly situated individuals were categorically 
entitled to assigned counsel under a per se rule, the Court announced a case-
by-case approach, applying the three-pronged balancing test of Mathews v. 
Eldridge (balancing the private interests at stake, the government’s 
interests, and the risk of error in the absence of assigned counsel).15 In 
announcing this case-by-case approach, as opposed to a per se rule, the 
Court held that there is a “presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to 
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his 
physical liberty.”16 
Following Lassiter, courts have generally determined that the cases 
before them required the case-by-case approach. Thus, courts have applied 
the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge in deciding whether to appoint 
counsel to indigent persons in civil proceedings, rather than recognizing a 
per se rule that would categorically provide appointed counsel. Nonetheless, 
Lassiter’s reiteration that a presumption to appointed counsel exists in 
situations where persons are faced with deprivation of physical liberty 
reinforces forceful arguments in support of a per se rule for most persons in 
removal proceedings. The arguments are strengthened when focusing on 
detained respondents and other subgroups, such as unaccompanied children 
and mentally incompetent respondents, who clearly demonstrate an inability 
to represent themselves in an adversarial judicial system. Regardless of 
which approach is found applicable for persons in removal proceedings, it is 
readily apparent that there are compelling arguments for providing 
appointed counsel to indigent respondents. 
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IV. THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
REQUIRE APPOINTED COUNSEL 
As previously noted, the majority of persons placed in removal 
proceedings are deprived of their liberty. The detained respondents are 
generally held at county jails contracted by the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”), or they are placed in one of nearly a dozen monolithic 
immigration prisons spread across the country, operated by private 
companies who contracted with DHS.17 As of May 3, 2010, there were 256 
jails, correctional facilities, and detention centers authorized to detain 
persons charged as removable.18 
The length of custody varies considerably. In defending the practice of 
mandatory detention, the government has previously asserted that the 
average length of custody for persons in removal proceedings was forty-
seven days, with a thirty day median.19 Even accepting these numbers as the 
most probable infringement on a person’s liberty, the potential of being 
locked up for a month or a month and a half (even if an individual were to 
ultimately prevail in the removal proceedings) creates sufficient deprivation 
of liberty to warrant the need for appointed counsel. There is simply not any 
comparable legal framework in the United States where an individual is 
faced with such deprivation of physical liberty—not to mention the other 
fundamental liberties hanging in the balance—without the right to 
appointed counsel. 
Moreover, the numbers cited by the government in Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510, 529 (2003), provide a skewed picture. As previously noted, the 
majority of persons in removal proceedings do not contest the charges 
against them, but rather (especially for those in detention) seek to be 
removed as quickly as possible. Those who do contest the removal charges, 
or seek an application for relief, are subjected to prolonged procedures. 
These respondents face prolonged detention that can stretch out over a 
period of years. In recognition of the wide scale nature of prolonged 
detention in removal proceedings, the Ninth Circuit recently certified a 
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circuit-wide class. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Casas-Castrillon v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“As Casas’ case ably demonstrates, aliens challenging an order of 
removal may languish in the system for years.”). Even individuals who 
prevailed in their removal proceedings have faced years of incarceration. 
See e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
V. THE FAILURE OF THE INA AND PREVAILING CASE LAW TO 
PROVIDE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In any other context, the enormous liberty interests at stake, the 
adversarial framework of the immigration court system, the complexity of 
the law, and the extreme imbalance of power would almost certainly lead to 
case law providing for the right to assigned counsel. Yet, in removal 
proceedings, there have been no such developments. 
One of the principal reasons, if not the primary factor, for this failure, is 
the statutory “Right to Counsel” enacted by Congress in the INA. The INA 
includes a statutory right labeled “Right to Counsel,”20 which, despite its 
title, has actually undermined any development to recognize that indigent 
respondents in removal proceedings should be entitled to assigned counsel. 
The law states: 
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in 
any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such 
removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege 
of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such 
counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall 
choose. 
With those six words, “at no expense to the Government,” the statute has 
managed to thwart most efforts by advocates to develop case law providing 
for the right to assigned counsel before they even begin.  Instead, case law 
examining the right to counsel in removal proceedings has focused on 
whether the respondents have been advised of their right to pursue legal 
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representation at their own expense, whether the immigration judge has 
provided them with sufficient time to look for their own counsel, and 
whether they received ineffective assistance of counsel.21 
Despite the provision expressly denying the right to counsel at 
government expense under the INA, there remains a notable absence of case 
law exploring the right to assigned counsel based on the Constitution. The 
right to assigned counsel in other criminal and civil proceedings was almost 
uniformly the result of constitutional challenges, not the result of 
Congress’s largesse. Indeed, it would be remarkable if Congress were to 
affirmatively act to create the right to assigned counsel for indigent persons 
in removal proceedings where case law had not already clarified that 
counsel is required in order to safeguard constitutional rights. 
In one of the very few federal court cases challenging the lack of 
assigned counsel, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
“[w]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present 
his position adequately to an immigration judge, he must be provided with a 
lawyer at the Government’s expense. Otherwise, ‘fundamental fairness’ 
would be violated.”22 Interestingly, in the underlying proceeding, the 
immigration judge had first rejected the respondent’s request for assigned 
counsel, relying on the statutory provision’s qualification, “at no expense to 
the Government.” Thus, the immigration judge ruled that the INA 
“prevented appointment of counsel at Government expense.”23 
The respondent accordingly argued before the Sixth Circuit that the 
“Right to Counsel” provision violated his constitutional right to due process 
under the law. The court held that, “[t]he test for whether due process 
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a 
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide 
fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process.’”24 In a footnote, the 
court recognized that case law from the Supreme Court demonstrated that 
fundamental fairness could require appointed counsel.25 Nonetheless, the 
court found that his case did not deprive him of due process since he had 
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legal counsel on appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and his 
lack of representation before the immigration judge did not undermine his 
ability, with his current attorney, to present the purely legal question his 
case presented on appeal. 
The few other courts that have addressed right to counsel challenges in 
related contexts have also recognized that fundamental fairness may require 
the appointment of counsel. In United States v. Campos-Asencio, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that, while there is no statutory right to 
assigned counsel, an individual may successfully argue that deprivation of 
assigned counsel in deportation proceedings violated his right to due 
process under the law: “[A]n alien has a right to counsel if the absence of 
counsel would violate due process under the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”26 In 
that case, the appellant had been charged with criminal re-entry after having 
been previously deported under Section 276 of the INA.27 Mr. Campos 
asserted that the deprivation of counsel in his prior deportation proceeding 
violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process under the law. The court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine if the deprivation of 
counsel resulted in a due process violation.28 
It cannot be overemphasized that while the statutory right to counsel fails 
to provide counsel at government expense, the federal courts have 
recognized that the Constitution provides an independent basis for 
determining whether an individual is entitled to assigned counsel. From 
Gideon, In re Gault, and Lassiter, the Supreme Court has focused on the 
constitutional underpinnings for the right to assigned counsel. The INA’s 
statutory provision does not preclude the government from assigning 
counsel to indigent persons. Rather, it simply informs the individuals that 
they do not have a statutory right under the INA to counsel at government 
expense. This does not prohibit the Department of Justice or its delegate, 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), in its efforts to 
ensure fundamental fairness in removal proceedings, from affirmatively 
bestowing a safeguard that is not required by the statute. More importantly, 
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the statute does nothing to undermine constitutional claims for assigned 
counsel.29 
VI. LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAMS ARE INADEQUATE 
REPLACEMENTS 
While neither Congress nor the Department of Justice has taken steps to 
provide assigned counsel to indigent respondents in removal proceedings, 
the EOIR has followed the lead of non-profit agencies to provide legal 
orientation programs to respondents detained at the largest immigration 
detention centers. After viewing the results of pilot projects, Congress 
appropriated $1 million in fiscal year 2002 to develop and implement the 
Legal Orientation Program (“LOP”) for detained respondents.30  
Initially, the LOP was focused on six detention centers, including the 
detention center in Washington State. By the fiscal year 2008, 
appropriations had increased to $3.7 million, allowing the expansion of the 
LOP to the twelve principle detention centers, and subsequently included 
the LOP for detained juveniles in other facilities.31 The LOP has expanded 
significantly from its inception, but the program is still limited to working 
only with detained immigrants. Moreover, even with regard to detained 
immigrants, in light of the rapid expansion of the detained percentage of 
persons in removal proceedings, the LOP is not able to provide resources 
for all detained immigrants.32 
But an even greater impediment is that the LOP is strictly limited to 
group and individual orientation sessions. Indeed, in administering the LOP, 
the EOIR apparently views the “Right to Counsel” provision under the INA 
as precluding any legal representation, including any legal advice and any 
legal practice or preparation of forms, even on a limited pro se basis.33 
Thus, the LOP does not provide any resources for direct representation, no 
matter how limited in scope: “Program providers are not permitted to use 
LOP funds to engage in legal representation.”34 Consequently, the numbers 
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of represented respondents remains abysmal, with less than 10 percent of 
detained respondents able to obtain legal representation.35 
While the LOP provides substantive assistance that is useful for assisting 
unrepresented individuals with initially identifying potential forms of relief, 
it can in no way compensate for the lack of legal representation. As 
previously noted, removal proceedings are complex and adversarial, in each 
case the unrepresented individual is pitted against a U.S. trial attorney 
trained in immigration law. The imbalance of power is further exacerbated 
by the fact that the respondents generally do not speak English and often 
have limited education. In addition, without legal representation, most 
respondents do not have access to obtain the necessary supporting 
documents to appropriately present their cases. 
No matter how limited in scope, the LOP provides valuable assistance to 
many unrepresented detained respondents. Nonetheless, it can in no way be 
credited as providing a viable alternative to legal representation. Even if all 
detained respondents in removal proceedings were guaranteed participation 
in legal orientation sessions, the overwhelming majority would still be 
denied fundamentally fair hearings. Even those respondents who understand 
the substance of the basic charges against them or those who are advised 
that they may qualify for an application for relief, are left with little or no 
understanding of the intricacies of the substantive provisions of the law. 
Nor can they generally learn the particulars of the legal process, which are 
required to successfully contest charges and present applications for relief. 
To the extent that the LOP is viewed as a remedy for ensuring 
fundamentally fair hearings to respondents, its implementation is 
counterproductive.36 Due process requires that persons receive direct legal 
representation in their removal proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the present, the vast majority of indigent respondents in removal 
proceedings are compelled to appear without legal representation. Contrary 
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to its title, the “Right to Counsel” provision in Section 292 of the INA (8 
U.S.C. § 1362) has actually undermined the right to counsel in removal 
proceedings by expressly stating that there is no statutory right to assigned 
counsel. However, given the enormous interests that are at stake in removal 
proceedings and the sharp imbalance of powers created by the indisputably 
complex and adversarial nature of the proceedings, constitutional case law 
provides a framework to assert the right to assigned counsel. As noted, two 
circuits have already recognized that in some cases, the “absence of counsel 
would violate due process under the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”37 The 
framework currently in place, especially governing those placed in 
detention during removal proceedings, provides ample opportunities for 
advocates to demonstrate cases where the absence of assigned counsel has 
indeed violated due process. 
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receive any orientation prior to their first hearing. Id. at 34. 
33 See Executive Office for Immigration Review, BIA April 14, 2009, Legal Orientation 
Program Protocols—Orientation vs. Representation. Stephen Lang. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 DOJ EOIR OPAT 09-57, supra note 10. 
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36 In passing a resolution supporting a due process right to counsel for all persons in 
removal proceedings, the ABA acknowledged the value of expanding LOPs to include 
nondetained respondents in removal proceedings, as well as all detained respondents. But 
more importantly, the ABA also recognized that LOPs were insufficient to guarantee a 
fundamentally fair hearing for the respondents. See American Bar Association. Right to 
Counsel Resolution. Adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 13, 2006), 
www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/immigration/107a_righttocounsel.doc. 
37 Campos-Ascencio, supra note 25, at 509. 
